Microsoft outage opens industry debate over cyber policy triggers

Lockton's Mark Luckin says system failure and dependent business interruption cover can engage without a breach, contesting an earlier read
Microsoft outage opens industry debate over cyber policy triggers
INSURANCE NEWS
By Daniel Wood
19 Nov 2026

The Microsoft 365 failure that disrupted businesses worldwide on Friday 13 November, including in Australia and New Zealand, has opened a disagreement inside the local cyber market about what it takes to trigger a policy and about how the class is being described to the buyers who most need it.

Mark Luckin (pictured), cyber and technology practice leader at Lockton Australia, contacted Insurance Business after reading our report that most cyber policies miss the outage trigger. His objection was not to the brokers quoted in it but more the premise he said the piece rested on.

"The article’s rhetoric – respectfully – begins from and continues a flawed premise that an actual or suspected breach is generally required before a cyber policy can respond," he said. "That may be true for particular privacy, incident-response, or network-security sections, but it is not a universal nor standard cyber-policy trigger."

Trigger and quantum are separate questions

One focus of Luckin’s argument is that two questions are being collapsed into one: whether an insuring clause is engaged by the event and whether any money is ultimately paid.

"A policy can be engaged by the nature of the event without any amount ultimately becoming payable," he said. "The absence of a payment because of a waiting period or retention is not evidence of a lack of policy trigger."

Read next: Microsoft outage misses the trigger in most cyber policies

Asked what waiting periods and retentions apply in the Australian market, he said business interruption waiting periods commonly range from around six to 12 hours for small and medium enterprises, up to 24 hours in some cases, although shorter periods may be negotiated and some policies apply different periods to the insured’s own systems and to dependent-provider events. Retentions vary materially, he said, from relatively modest amounts for SMEs to eight-figure amounts for the largest organisations.

On those numbers he accepted that a short outage would be unlikely to exceed most waiting periods. "However, that does not mean – and is a very separate question of whether – a policy’s insuring clause is incapable of being triggered," he said.

He also challenged the assumption that the event was brief. "It has been widely reported that the interruption commenced at approximately 3:17am Sydney time on Friday. For certain policies, this may be considered the point at which the waiting period began to run," he said. "On that basis, even policies subject to a 12-hour waiting period may have satisfied that requirement potentially giving rise to a business interruption claim."

Microsoft’s preliminary post-incident report, dated November 15, records an incident start of 4:20pm UTC on November 12 and an end of 4:10pm UTC on November 13 – a window of close to 24 hours, or roughly 3.20am Friday to 3.10am Saturday in Sydney. That is the global incident clock rather than any single insured’s qualifying period of disruption, which is what a claim would turn on.

Neither side can put a number on the market

Asked what proportion of Australian SME cyber placements actually carry system failure and dependent provider cover, as distinct from it being available in the market, Luckin declined to estimate. "I am not aware of reliable market-wide Australian data that establishes a defensible percentage, so I would not attach a number to it," he said.

His position is that the cover has been spreading. He said inclusion of non-malicious system failure and some form of dependent business interruption had been reinforced by events such as the July 2024 CrowdStrike incident, and that it is "cover widely available, increasingly common in contemporary standalone cyber products, and not confined to a small group of highly sophisticated insureds".

Read next: Microsoft outage puts Australian cyber policy wordings to the test

That is a narrower disagreement than it may first appear. Joe Hershewe, claims practice leader at Bellrock Advisory in Sydney, scoped his own assessment to "most mid-market cyber wordings" and said the broader cover generally sits with sophisticated purchasers buying standalone policies. Luckin is describing modern standalone products. No wording-by-wording audit of the Australian market exists to settle which cohort the typical SME buyer sits in, a gap also evident in our earlier reporting on checking cyber policy wordings after the outage.

No blanket notifications at Lockton

Luckin said Lockton reviewed a range of client programmes after the event "and identified credible potential response pathways under business interruption, system failure, dependent business interruption and, where applicable, widespread-event provisions", with practical significance varying by waiting period, retention, schedule and endorsement.

It has not, however, produced notifications. "At this stage, we have not recommended blanket or precautionary notification simply because a client experienced some disruption," he said. The firm’s approach, he said, has been to first establish the duration and nature of the interruption, whether the trigger is present, and whether covered loss might realistically exceed the waiting period and retention.

He argued that a low claims count should not be read as a verdict on the class. "Importantly, the fact that few claims may ultimately be notified or paid shouldn’t be used to support any proposition around policies not having the ability to be triggered or respond," he said. "It rather simply reflects that the outage was too short, the loss too limited, or the applicable waiting period or retention was not exceeded."

Where the two readings converge

For a broker placing mid-market cover, the two positions arrive at a similar practical answer by different routes. On the Bellrock reading, most insureds never get through the door. On Luckin’s, they get through the door and then fail on waiting period or retention. Either way, few Australian SMEs are likely to be paid for this event.

One element has moved since the original interviews. Jennifer Clancy, advisor for cyber risk at Bellrock Advisory in Sydney, noted at the time that widespread event criteria could not be assessed while the cause remained unknown. Microsoft has since attributed the failure to a latent software defect in its networking gateway, with no malicious activity involved – which removes a breach trigger from consideration entirely and leaves system failure and dependent business interruption as the only routes to cover, a point also relevant to the providers assessed in Insurance Business Australia’s 5-Star Cyber 2026 report on the best cyber insurance providers.

Luckin was explicit about why he raised it. He said the characterisation was "not only technically flawed but actively unhelpful at a time when greater awareness and adoption of cyber insurance, particularly among SMEs, remains essential", and risked reinforcing the misconception that cyber insurance responds only to malicious attacks or privacy incidents.

"A more accurate and constructive analysis would explain that modern cyber policies can respond to a much broader range of technology failures, while emphasising the importance of selecting appropriate business interruption, system failure, and dependent-provider cover," he said.

Luckin also accepted the limits of his own position. "It would be equally wrong to suggest that every cyber policy will respond to the Microsoft 365 disruption," he said.

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