For four hours on Friday evening, not a single commercial flight left an American airport. The Federal Aviation Administration ordered a nationwide ground stop shortly before 4 p.m. Eastern, about 9 p.m. in London, after switches and routers in its ageing telecommunications network were overwhelmed with data. US officials said there was no sign of a cyberattack.
Transatlantic travellers felt it quickly. Flights from US airports to the UK were held along with everything else, and airlines warned that the backlog would run into the weekend, leaving British holidaymakers and business travellers stuck on the wrong side of the Atlantic.
The obvious question for a UK reader is whether the same thing could happen here. The less comfortable answer is that, on a smaller scale, it already has, repeatedly.
The template was set on the August bank holiday in 2023, when a flight plan that NATS's systems could not process knocked out automatic flight planning. Controllers fell back on manual input, and the failure went on to cost airlines more than £100 million in refunds and compensation, Insurance Business has reported.
It has not been a one-off. On July 30, 2025, a technical issue at NATS again caused delays and cancellations, and the Civil Aviation Authority said the resulting disruption was likely to count as extraordinary circumstances.
This autumn brought two more. A software defect at the Swanwick centre on September 8 grounded more than 1,300 flights in a single day, with 177 more cancelled the following day. Less than two weeks later, a connectivity fault at Prestwick, which handles about 42% of UK traffic across Scotland, Northern Ireland and northern England, wiped out 140 departures and 137 arrivals, according to Cirium figures.
The CAA has commissioned an independent review of NATS's resilience, due to report within six months of the September failures. Its findings will land in a market that has now absorbed four significant air traffic control disruptions in a little over three years.
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On paper, the two systems could hardly be more different. The FAA is a federal agency whose capital spending depends on Congress, and decades of stop-start funding have left it with a backlog of obsolete kit. In 2024 it rated 51 of its 138 air traffic control systems unsustainable and 54 more potentially so, and a Government Accountability Office audit in September found its $12.5 billion modernization program lacked a reliable cost estimate or integrated schedule.
NATS, by contrast, has been a public-private partnership since 2001. The government holds 49% and a golden share, the Airline Group owns 42%, staff hold 5% and Heathrow's owner 4%, according to Eurocontrol. Its en-route business is funded by charges on airspace users under price controls set by the CAA, so it does not have to fight for an annual appropriation in the way the FAA does.
That structure is often held up in Washington as a fix for American air traffic control. Britain's recent record suggests it is not a cure-all. The causes given for the UK failures have centred on software and data handling, including a defect that NATS said corrupted information in a fraction of a second, and on lost connectivity at a key centre, rather than on equipment too old to maintain.
The common thread with Friday's US outage is complexity rather than funding. Each country runs its airspace through a small number of central systems, and when one of them fails, it does not degrade gently. It stops traffic across the whole network. That is the feature underwriters should focus on.
Here the UK and the US part company in a way that matters for claims. Under UK passenger rights law, an air traffic control failure is generally treated as an extraordinary circumstance, so airlines do not owe fixed-sum compensation. But the right to care survives. The CAA has said in successive disruptions that airlines must still provide meals, refreshments and hotel accommodation proportionate to the delay, and that this is due whatever caused the disruption.
That is a better safety net than either the US or Canada has. American airlines owe little beyond a refund when air traffic control is at fault, and Canadian rules require rebooking or a refund but not meals or hotels.
It also means Friday's outage affects British travellers. unevenly UK passenger rights cover flights from a non-UK airport to the UK when they are operated by a UK or EU airline, so a passenger stranded in New York on a British carrier could expect care. The same passenger booked on a US airline would generally have no equivalent statutory right, leaving the hotel bill to their own pocket or their travel policy.
Travel insurance remains uneven too. Some insurers, including Admiral and the Post Office, sell enhanced trip disruption options that explicitly name air traffic control restrictions and technical problems. Many standard policies carry no such wording, so two clients caught in the same outage can receive very different outcomes, as Insurance Business has noted in its coverage of regulatory scrutiny of travel cover after repeated NATS failures.
That gap is already showing up in complaints. Travel was the only UK general insurance line where complaints rose in the second half of 2025, up 19.4%, and Financial Ombudsman referrals for travel insurance climbed 58% year on year in the third quarter of last year.
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A four-hour shutdown of every UK departure would require a failure on a scale Britain has not yet seen. But the ingredients are the same: a handful of central systems, each capable of halting traffic across the network, and a recent history of those systems failing in ways that were not predicted. Four disruptions in just over three years make it hard to argue that the risk is rare.
For travel insurers, the lesson from both sides of the Atlantic is about accumulation. Travel cover was priced around individual, unconnected losses, such as a missed flight or a broken leg. An air traffic control failure produces thousands of simultaneous claims from one cause outside any traveller's control. Set against a UK market of roughly £980 million in premiums, with ABI members paying £472 million on more than 500,000 claims in 2024, any single event is small. A recurring one is a pricing question.
There is a conduct question too. Under the Consumer Duty, insurers must show their products offer fair value. A standard policy that excludes air traffic control disruption may be harder to defend once that risk has materialised repeatedly, and the FCA has already flagged claims handling and consumer understanding in travel as priorities.
For brokers and intermediaries, the immediate steps are practical:
The short answer to the headline, then, is that it could happen here. In a smaller way it already has, and the bill has mostly fallen on airlines' care budgets and travellers' insurance policies.