South Carolina Supreme Court lets a court-appointed receiver chase the insurance assets of an English asbestos defendant – despite an English court's worldwide injunction.
In a May 27, 2026 opinion, the justices affirmed, with modifications, a lower court order putting Cape Intermediate Holdings Limited (CIHL) under the control of a pre-judgment receiver. CIHL is the corporate descendant of Cape Asbestos Company, LTD, which was incorporated in England in 1893. The receiver, Peter D. Protopapas, was appointed in a lung cancer suit brought by John A. Tibbs and his wife Margaret, who allege a group of defendants caused Tibbs' illness.
The court trimmed the receiver's authority but left the core power intact. He can pursue Cape's insurance assets and any third-party claims that might produce money to satisfy a future judgment. The justices reversed one finding – that Cape was in danger of insolvency – but otherwise upheld the receivership.
For insurers, the headline is that a state supreme court has signed off on using the receivership tool to reach a foreign company's potential insurance recoveries when the company refuses to appear and defend. Cape, the court found, had set a corporate policy of not engaging in United States asbestos litigation. Quoting from Cape's own internal record, the opinion described Cape's view of itself as a victim of what it called the US product liability culture.
Justice Hill, writing for the court, said that stance – paired with specific conduct in this case – amounted to moral fraud, a South Carolina doctrine that lets a court impose a pre-judgment receivership where a defendant shows a deliberate intent to defeat, delay or hinder creditors trying to collect.
Two incidents drove the finding. The first involved a subpoena the receiver served on Lloyd's of London to identify any relevant policies issued to CIHL. After learning of it, Ran Oren, the sole director of CIHL, wrote to Lloyd's on Altrad letterhead and told the insurer not to comply, citing an English court injunction against the receiver. The court suggested Oren's letter, written the way it was, signalled that insurance did in fact exist.
The second was a mutual release between CIHL, the Altrad appellants and other third-party defendants, signed after the receiver was appointed. In it, the parties waived any claims against each other tied to this and other US asbestos cases. The court treated the release as a bold attempt to defeat, delay or hinder the Tibbs and other alleged asbestos victims in this country.
The appellants – Charter Consolidated, Ltd., ESAB Corporation, Central Mining & Investment Corporation, Ltd., Mohed Altrad and Altrad Investment Authority S.A.S. – had argued the receivership was a dead letter outside South Carolina. They pointed to a ruling from the English High Court of Justice for England and Wales, which leaned on the 1990 decision Adams v. Cape Industries plc to enjoin the receiver worldwide.
The South Carolina court rejected that line. Personal jurisdiction in a US court, it said, is a question of US and state law, not English law. Justice Hill wrote that the English court would itself be surprised at how the appellants had stretched its ruling and Adams. The justices also turned aside estoppel and res judicata defenses based on Adams, noting that case decided only whether a Texas judgment was enforceable in the United Kingdom.
The court did trim the receiver's powers. The 2023 appointment order in the related Park case had let the receiver administer Cape's assets, accept service, engage counsel and take any steps necessary to protect Cape's interests. Going forward, the justices said, a pre-judgment receiver is limited to actions tied to the specific case in which he was appointed – here, collecting insurance assets and pursuing claims that could produce money for the Tibbs plaintiffs.
The justices also brushed off the appellants' argument that the orders were void because no bond was set under § 15-65-60 of the South Carolina Code. The appellants, the court said, had no standing to enforce the bond rule unless they were prepared to admit they and Cape are alter egos. And the court held that failing to set a bond makes an order voidable, not void, and that there was no real need for a bond where the only property in play is insurance and third-party claims that would benefit Cape if collected.
The court also confirmed CIHL – not the Cape plc incorporated in the Bailiwick of Jersey in 2011 that the appellants pointed to – is the correct defendant, citing Rule 17(a)'s protection against dismissal over misnomers. Justice Hill wrote that the appellants' name games were over.
The case now returns to the trial court, where the merits, including the validity and effect of the release as an affirmative defense, remain to be decided.
