A data center can come through a major storm without physical damage and still face days of downtime. The Uptime Institute's 2025 annual outage analysis confirmed power failure as the most common trigger of serious and severe outages. The power grid, like most of the infrastructure data centers depend on, lies entirely outside the facility. That dependency gap is where data center business interruption exposure most often goes unaccounted.
Johanna Rohrer, risk analyst for natural hazards and climate risks at HDI Global Risk Consulting, explores what a complete BI exposure picture actually requires. She also maps the gaps that most risk programs leave open, from supply chain timing to continuity planning under real-world conditions.
Most data center risk programs focus on what could damage the building. That assumption, Rohrer argues, leaves the biggest exposures unaddressed. "A facility can be physically undamaged and still unable to operate if grid power, telecommunications, cooling, access routes or fuel supply are disrupted," she said.
Those dependencies run entirely beyond the property line. Rohrer also notes that financial damage does not stop at repair costs. "It accumulates through service interruption, reduced operating capacity, delays in restoring critical systems, and the time needed to reach the site or source specialist equipment and components," she said.
What makes data center business interruption scenarios particularly difficult to contain, Rohrer explains, is how failures interact. A severe storm can trigger flooding, cut power, restrict site access, and delay fuel deliveries simultaneously.
"The most challenging scenarios are usually a result of cascading events, not isolated failures," she said. "The initial, triggering event may be short, but the interaction between these dependencies is what extends the interruption."
That reframes the central question in any BI assessment. "The real question isn't only what could damage the building," Rohrer said. "It's which internal or external dependency could stop the facility from continuing or restoring operations.
"A strong BI assessment connects the physical hazard to the full chain of consequences, from the initiating event through utility loss and restricted access to repair, replacement and complete recovery."
"Supply chain vulnerability can be a major driver of how long a business interruption lasts," Rohrer said. Supply chain gaps rarely cause the initial outage, but they frequently determine when a facility fully recovers.
Data centers run on specialized electrical, cooling, and IT equipment that isn't available off the shelf. Aon recently raised its data center lifecycle insurance and risk program to $3.5 billion, a signal of how complex and consequential that specialization risk has become. After a regional event, multiple affected facilities often compete for the same parts and the same specialist contractors.
"A replacement part may exist in theory, yet recovery can still stall if transport routes are disrupted, technicians can't reach the facility, or multiple sites need the same equipment after one regional event," Rohrer said.
Those are distinct stall points. Any one of them can extend a business interruption well past the initial disruption window.
"Supply chain preparedness belongs in operational resilience planning, not just procurement," Rohrer said.
"Preparedness varies facility by facility. What matters most is whether a backup arrangement holds up in practice. A plan is only as good as the equipment, people and logistics actually available under real event conditions."
Meaningful redundancy starts with independence. A backup that shares a substation, corridor, or flood zone with the primary offers no real protection when both go down in the same event. Power, cooling, telecommunications, and fuel supply each need to stay available under the same conditions that disable the primary system.
Most data center operators treat redundancy as duplication. Rohrer sets a stricter standard. "Meaningful redundancy is more than having two of something. Redundant systems need true independence, so a single event can't take both out at once," she said.
Rohrer identifies some of the common failure modes. "Two power feeds offer limited protection if they run through the same substation or the same exposed corridor," she said. "Backup generators offer limited protection if fuel can't reach the site, or if the generators and their electrical systems sit in the same flood or storm zone as the primary system."
According to Allianz Commercial, most global data center capacity operates in areas with heightened natural catastrophe risk. Shared failure points are a sector-wide vulnerability.
The backup fails Rohrer's test when the same event can disable both the primary and the backup.
"Physical separation, diversity of supply and eliminating shared failure points are central to real resilience," she said. "Operators should ask not just whether a backup exists, but whether it stays available under the same event that disables the primary system."
According to Rohrer, continuity plans should be tested against scenarios where multiple systems fail at once, covering backup power and cooling, staff and contractor access, fuel and parts delivery, and communications. Testing must also address the transition from emergency response to full recovery, including who owns each decision and which outside parties need to be involved.
Most continuity plans are tested against a single equipment failure. Rohrer argues that scope misses what natural hazard and climate events actually produce.
"Emergency and continuity plans should be tested against realistic scenarios that hit several systems at once," she said. "Relevant scenarios include extreme heat paired with peak electricity demand, a severe storm causing an extended power outage, or flooding that disrupts both technical infrastructure and site access."
Recovery is a separate gap, Rohrer explains. "Testing also needs to cover the shift from emergency response to recovery. Knowing how long critical operations can be sustained isn't enough. Operators need clarity on what full recovery requires, who owns each decision, and which outside parties need to be involved."
CISA's guidance on infrastructure dependencies treats this kind of mapping as a foundation for resilience planning.
Stress tests should evolve alongside the facility, Rohrer notes. As IT load, cooling demands, supplier relationships, and surrounding hazard conditions change, so should the scenarios. Specialist brokers have expanded data center risk management and insurance programs to reflect how quickly the risk picture shifts.
"Resilience is an ongoing discipline, not a one-time plan you file away," Rohrer said.
